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As it is well known the debate of new public management, together with the shortage of 
public funds in most developing countries, has had a considerable impact on social services 
delivery.  Accordingly,  many  developing  countries  are  searching  positive  impacts  on  the 
efficiency, equity and quality provision of the public services through increasing competition 
and active participation of the private sector, considering public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
as the appropriate instrument to attain such endeavour. Accordingly, PPPs have been used for 
many and widespread purposes, ranging from the construction of physical infrastructure, to 
the provision of health and social services, to public administration. But, while the idea of a 
PPP in general is theoretically appealing, its practical implementation in developing countries 
is  not  so  easy  as  theory  suggests.  Perhaps  partly  for  that  reason,  a  large  number  of 
implemented  PPPs  have  left  the  contractual  parties  dissatisfied,  which  may  indicate  that, 
either  developing  country  authorities,  or  investors  (or  both)  may  have  had  too  high 
expectations  to  what  could  be  attained.  Though  some  contracts  have  been  granted  under 
circumstances that made them susceptible to changes in the political environment, the large 
majority of the others have also suffered from inflated or unrealistic expectations. So, the 
need for a legal and regulatory framework, which can guarantee a transparent and credible 
relationship between the different actors, is critical. Unfortunately many, if not all, regulators 
in developing countries lack one, or more, qualities required for an effective regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
This  paper  analyses  the  prospects  of  Public-Private  Partnerships  (PPPs)  in  developing 
countries. In a precedent paper (Pessoa, 2004) we have argued that PPPs, conditional on some 
assumptions, can be efficient forms of enhancing well-being and of promoting growth. Our 
argumentation was grounded on a PPP definition and some assumptions. As a matter of fact, 
we have defined PPP as a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the 
private sector
1 to achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own individual 
interests. This definition implies that in a PPP each partner shares in the design; contributes a 
fraction  of  the  financial,  managerial  and  technical  resources  needed  to  execute,  and 
sometimes operate, the project in accordance with each partner's comparative advantage, and 
partially takes on the risks associated with the project and obtains the benefits, expected by 
each partner, which the project creates.  
Defined in the above-mentioned way, a PPP entails some assumptions. Firstly, a change in 
roles: a PPP requires a shift in the roles and attitudes of public and private entities, moving 
away from the usual client-contractor approach towards focusing on the core functions of 
supervision and regulation by the public authorities, and assuming greater responsibilities and 
risks in execution, operation and the mobilisation of resources by the private sector. This 
change requires a transformation of the partners as some capacities of the public sector are 
transferred away to the private sector.  
Secondly, a sustained collaborative effort in order to attain a common objective is assumed. 
The basis of the third "P" of the PPP, entails a joint alliance between the public and private 
sectors beyond the traditional contractual relationship. Such association brings the best of 
each partner’s competence to optimise the achievement of the common objective. Given the 
mid-term, or long-term, nature of that objective and the transformation generated by the shift 
in roles, the joint alliance needs to be sustained over a long period of time. The longer the 
nature of the objective, the larger are the uncertainties associated with the project and the 
more critical and relevant the third "P" of a PPP becomes. 
                                                 
1 The composition of the private sector is complex. The private sector can be categorized into private-for-profit 
institutions and private not-for-profit organizations. Commercial enterprises essentially belong to the category of 
profit-oriented organizations, and NGOs, professional associations, and other non-government institutions are 
examples of not-for-profit organizations. Whereas the focus of PPP at first has been on the relationship between 
the government and the for-profit sector, recently there has been a shift of attention towards the role of the non-
profit sector and its possible contribution in providing goods and services. 
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Finally,  an  assumption  on  the  individual  interests  of  each  partner  is  crucial:  generally,  it 
consists of a return of investment for the private partner
2, and a net benefit to the society and 
the economy as a whole for the public entity, through the achievement of specific goals, such 
as the improvement of accessibility, the reduction of transport costs or the actual provision 
and deliverance of other public services in an efficient way
3. These interests are channelled 
through the definition of risks. Thus, a clear assignment of risks is a precondition of the 
implementation of a PPP project.  
Whereas the idea of a PPP in general is theoretically appealing, its practical implementation in 
developing countries is not so easy as theory suggests. On the one hand, there has been much 
confusion in using the expression PPP
4. Often donor agencies and governments promoted 
privatisation and provided subsidies to private entrepreneurs in the name of building public-
private partnerships (World Bank 1986), while they are promoting other forms of private 
involvement. On the other hand, governments of developing countries frequently overvaluate 
the actual usefulness of PPPs.  
As we have said above, in order to fulfil the criterion of a “partnership” there must be some 
ongoing set of interactions, an agreement on objectives and methods as well as a division of 
labour to achieve the goals. So, public-private-partnerships are therefore no equivalent to the 
promotion of a free market economy, as usually some governments seem to consider. As a 
matter of fact, looking at the reality of PPP in developing countries, we note that the debate is 
very much concentrated on “complementarity” and not on cooperation (Robinson and White, 
1997), which basically reduces the role of government to providing a favourable environment 
to the other social actors.  
Given these conditions, this paper analyses some forms of involvement of the private sector 
and the potential of PPPs in developing countries. The outline is as follows. In section 2 we’ll 
characterize  what  we  mean  by  social  sector  and  impure  public  goods.  In  section  3  we’ll 
discuss the role of government in providing impure public goods. We’ll dedicate section 4 to 
the make versus contracting out decision. In section 5 we’ll describe some reasons, in an 
economics  perspective,  which  must  configure  the  role  of  private  sector  involvement  in 
                                                 
2 If the private partner belongs to the not-for-profit category, the private interest is generally a way of attaining 
its own main object more easily. 
3 The public authorities must put a clear and stable framework that will be sufficiently transparent to the private 
partner in place. This is notably the case for technical standards, taxation, and the setting of toll levels. 
4 For both a clarification of the concept of PPP and a historical perspective of the public-private mixing, see 
Wettenhall (2004). 
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providing impure public goods. Section 6 describes some conditions that are favourable to the 
establishment of PPPs and relates them with some requirements in order to assure an effective 
regulatory framework in developing countries. The paper closes with some conclusions for 
discussion and future research. 
 
2. “Impure” public goods  
As it is well known, the role of government in formerly developed countries started from the 
very limited scope of Adam Smith’s “cheap government” that provides only defence and the 
administration  of  justice.  However,  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  the  relative  share  of 
government fiscal activities tended to increase steadily in the national economy towards a 
greater government (see, for instance, Peacock and Wiseman 1961). 
Economics teach that the pricing mechanism of the market secures an optimal allocation of 
resources,  if  certain  conditions  are  met.  For  private  goods,  these  conditions  are  satisfied 
reasonably  well  over  wide  areas  in  the  so-called  market  economy.  In  these  areas,  the 
government normally does not have itself to get involved with matters of resource allocation. 
There are, however, a number of conditions where the market forces cannot secure optimal 
results, and here we are faced with the problem of how the government can interfere to obtain 
a more efficient resource allocation. 
According  to  public  economics  literature,  we  can  distinguish  between  public  goods  and 
private goods. Pure public goods are best thought of as a scientific term used to describe a 
hypothetical good that is non-rival in consumption and, simultaneously, has a zero degree of 
exclusion.  In  the  actual  economy,  goods  that  are  nearer  this  concept  are  defence  and 
administration of justice. By contrast, a pure private good is a supposed good whose benefits 
are completely rival in consumption and has simultaneously a perfect degree of exclusion. So, 
depending upon the degree of each characteristic, goods and services are classified from the 
pure  public  good  on  one  extreme  to  a  pure  private  good  on  the  other.  There  is  a  wide 
consensus that the main role of government is providing pure public goods.  
No doubt, there are a wide variety of intermediate areas between two extreme cases in relation 
to various degrees of non-rivalness and exclusion. We may call relevant goods provided in 
these areas “impure public goods”. As a consequence, as shown in Figure 1, both private 
sector  and  government  have  an  overlapping  zone  from  which  impure  public  goods  are 
provided to the national population. In the context of this paper, social sector is defined as a   5
set of activities that deals with goods (named impure public goods or merit goods) included in 
that overlapping zone. 
 









So, the distinction between private and public goods by using two characteristics is not of an 
absolute kind. Inefficiencies occasionally arise in the provision of private goods through the 
market process. Wherever such is the case, we could say that an element of public goods is 
involved  with  certain  social  value.  The  difference  is  essentially  one  of  degree,  but  its 
distinction remains of fundamental importance. 
However,  theoretically  an  unambiguous  line  can  be  drawn  between  two  types  of  goods 
(private goods provided for adequately by the market and public goods satisfied through the 
government action), in practice we need to consider situations where government corrective 
action  is  required  to  secure  an  allocation  of  resources  that  is  in  line  with  consumer 
preferences.  Certain  goods  are  satisfied  by  the  market,  subject  to  the exclusion  principle, 
within the limits of effective demands. But, if they are considered so meritorious that their 
satisfaction ought to be provided for through the government over and above what is supplied 
by the market and paid for by private buyers, they become a sort of “public” goods. This 
second type of public goods is usually referred to as merit goods, whose typical examples 
include such services as free education, free health services, subsidized low-cost housing, 
etc
5. 
                                                 
5 See Musgrave (1959, pp. 13-14). 
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Obviously, the satisfaction of merit goods cannot be explained in the same terms as that of 
pure  public  goods.  Although  both  are  two  so-called  public  goods  in  that  the  government 
provides them, different principles are applied. Public goods in general constitute a special 
problem  caused  by  market  failures,  but  the  provision  of  merit  goods  because  involve 
interference  with  consumer  preferences  fall  within  the  scope  of  consumer  autonomy,  as 
private goods are satisfied.  
Some goods that the government is now provided for may fall on the frontier between private 
and public sectors (i.e., social sector in our terms), where exclusion can be applied to part of 
the benefits gained but not to all. Public provision for free educational or for free health 
services are typical cases in point. Such services are of direct benefit to the particular pupils or 
residents, but apart from this, everybody enjoys from living in a more educated or healthier 
community.  Thus,  goods  that  come  into  view  of  society  as  merit  goods  may  include 
substantial positive externalities.  
Figure  2  intends  to  clarify  the  basic  nature  of  goods  in  whose  provision  government  is 
involved by using two criteria: efficiency and equity.  
 











Efficiency is taken on the horizontal axis while equity corresponds to the vertical axis. It is 
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would be located in the intermediate position, between pure public goods (type A) and more 
rival goods.  
However, government has provided for other services (type C), not generally named as merit 
goods.  Utilities  such  as  water  supply,  gas,  electricity  and  telecommunications  and  certain 
modes  of  transport  such  as  rail,  all  include  natural  monopoly  characteristics  arising  from 
persistent  economies  of  scale  and  scope.  These  characteristics  mean  that  competition  is 
unlikely to develop, or if it develops, it will be uneconomic because of the duplication of 
assets. Although technological advances, notably in telecommunications, have reduced some 
of the natural monopoly characteristics in utilities, permitting economic competition in certain 
areas of service delivery, nevertheless each of the utilities retains some natural monopoly 
features. As a consequence, privatisation of these industries, in whole or in part, threats the 
introduction of private-sector monopolies that will exploit their economic power in the market 
place, leading to supernormal profits and a consequent reduced consumer welfare. Consumers 
may suffer from both no or limited choice of goods and services and face monopoly prices.  
On the other hand, looking at equity, a society might be interested in correcting the final 
allocation of goods and services as it closely depends on the initial distribution of wealth. 
Therefore the government might want to correct these inequities by a policy, which directly 
benefits the poorer part of the population, e.g. providing services at a low cost or for free to 
the poorest part of society. It is, however, quite arbitrary to draw the vertical line of social 
value among each item, because it depends on value judgments. Consequently, the amount of 




3. The role of government in social sector 
In the provision of public and social goods economic theory suggests that market failure and 
equity  considerations  call  for  governmental  intervention.  The  role  of  government  can  be 
described as consisting of the following: 
•  Overcoming  market  failures.  For  goods  of  type  A  and  type  B,  market  failure  means 
essentially  an  underprovision,  e.g.  in  the  case  of  the  health  sector  either  non  patient-
                                                 
6 A position of strong individualism, like the prevailing in the US, could demand that merit goods be provided 
for, to a considerable extent, by private sector, while the prevalence of social values, like in the North European 
Countries, tends to extend the desirable sphere of merit goods. 
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related  preventive  services  or  disease  control  and  vaccination/immunisation  programs. 
Where needs are likely to go unmet because of market failure, there is a role for the 
government to step in. When the social benefits of services exceed the private benefits, 
there is likely to be sub-optimal provision and this often calls for government provision. 
As  one  example,  people  typically  contract  sexually-transmitted  diseases  (STDs) 
accidentally. By bearing some of the cost of detecting and treating STDs, governments 
confer benefits not just on the individuals treated, but also on those who may otherwise be 
at risk of infection. The same can be told about vaccination programs and other forms of 
diseases  control.  Another  example  of  market  failure  in  developing  countries  is  the 
education of girls. Many families fail to see any benefit from sending girls to school or are 
averse to give up the household labour, or income, they make available. However, as a 
social  investment,  girls’  education  is  crucial  because  it  is  associated  with  improved 
opportunities for them to live longer, richer, and more rewarding lives — and with better 
health and social outcomes for their children. Thus, by encouraging the education of girls, 
through educational scholarships or consciousness-raising campaigns, governments can 
benefit both girls themselves as well as their families and communities. This example may 
be extended to the health sector, as the welfare of infants depends heavily on the health 
status of the mother. For goods of type C market failures mainly relates to the existence of 
co-ordination  malfunctions  induced  by  scale  economies.  There  is  the  case  of  external 
economies that arise when a new highway is built or as the size of a telecommunication 
service increases. The market failure is that at a given point in time, current prices may 
not convey the information about prospective expansion that is relevant to attaining a 
lower cost of production (Scitovsky, 1954; Chenery, 1960). 
•  Providing for the poor, the rural and under-served populations. Providing health care or 
education in rural areas tends to be particularly difficult, and generally unprofitable from a 
private viewpoint. Not only rural populations are often small or dispersed but also private 
providers are often scarce or nonexistent
7. The public sector is best-placed to provide a 
safety net for citizens who cannot pay market prices for health or education. However, this 
can be achieved by providing services directly or by creating incentives for the private 
sector to carry out the task.  
                                                 
7 Government clearly has a role providing services here, but it can also act in other ways. It can place obligations 
on private providers to provide broader access when they occupy a monopoly position or consider subsidizing 
access to private systems for disadvantaged groups. 
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•  Implementing appropriate regulations to ensure quality. In education, quality is usually 
monitored  by  evaluation  and  accreditation,  with  private  institutions  expected  to  meet 
minimum standards. Consumers will also act as a force for quality, but only if they have 
sufficient information. Governments can act as important providers of this information. 
But the existence of asymmetrical information is also overwhelming in the health sector. 
When drugs are sold on the open market the manufacturer is usually better informed on 
the efficiency and safety of the drug than the purchaser. To address the described market 
failures  the  government  usually  reacts  doing  something  to  minimise  the  effects  of 
asymmetric information, e.g. the official registration of health professionals and official 
recognition of drug quality. 
•  Controlling costs. Quite frequently, governments act to put a ceiling on fees private sector 
providers can charge. This is controversial, as it causes a market distortion, and should be 
done with care. However, restrictions may be necessary where there is little competition, 
no parallel public provision, or where consumers are relatively poorly informed about 
their needs and the quality of the provision. Pharmaceutical cost is one area where the 
potential for excess profits is high and control may be necessary, but in goods of type C 
the problem is also real. 
•  Additionally, the government must deal with other examples of market failures, such as 
the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, associated to the privaty run insurance 
schemes, which leads to an unequal coverage of health care services
8. 
The  presented  stylised  facts  on  the  role  of  government  have  been  mainly  derived  from 
theoretical considerations. In practice, however, some of the above mentioned points have to 
be  equated  with  the  possibility  of  government  failures.  If  one  looks  at  the  role  of  the 
government’s performance in practice one has to recognize that due to allocative inefficiency, 
operational inefficiency and equity problems the state sometimes poses more problems than 
solutions. Additionally, if social services are provided for free and are accessible, then the 
quality is often so bad that people prefer to go to a private provider and to pay fees with a 
certain guarantee of a quality treatment. But if people prefer a private provider even if they 
have to pay fees, a question arises: Why not “contracting out”? 
 
                                                 
8 Private insurers will only include good risks in their schemes. This behaviour makes risk pooling among a 
society difficult and leaves the bad risks to the public sector. 
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4. Why not “contracting out”? 
The expression “contracting out”, in this context, means the outsourcing of activities formerly 
done by the public sector as popularised by the discussion of new public management. Such 
debate, opened in developed countries, like the USA and the UK, spills over to the developing 
ones with a considerable impact on social services delivery. Additionally, in the context of a 
worldwide welfare systems reform, decentralisation of services from the national to the local 
level is frequently suggested in conjunction with an improved participation of the population 
in determining and implementing the services. Contracting out could be an element in this 
overall strategy (WHO 1998). 
The main strength of the private sector is its variety, with players acting for different motives. 
In particular, there is an important distinction between profit and non-profit organizations. In 
recent years, non-profits have proved especially skilled at improving provision to the poorer 
people, their size and flexibility allowing them to achieve notable successes in areas where 
governments have failed.  
Looking at the private sector in general, the following strengths are usually referred to: 
•  Improving quality. Private providers must develop their businesses and, in most situations, 
this involves retaining existing customers as well as attracting new ones. They tend to be 
highly innovative and also to learn from their competitors, thus aiding the transmission of 
best practice. The private sector can also act as a leader in demanding that information is 
made available to the public. 
•  Improving  customer  service.  Public  services  are  recognized  the  world  over  for  low-
standards  of  customer  care.  In  recent  years,  many  business  sectors  have  been 
revolutionized  by  a  new  customer-focus.  Education  and  health  stand  to  make  similar 
gains. It is interesting to note that when poor people are seriously ill, they often borrow to 
see a doctor privately. 
•  Improving  management  standards.  Management  standards  are  generally  higher  in  the 
private  sector,  with  staff  usually  better paid  and motivated.  So, business  can act as  a 
partner transferring important skills for a great lot of sectors including the ones of health 
and education. 
•  Investing  in  research  and  development.  The  private  sector  is  well  suited  to  carry  out 
research and to develop new techniques. The returns from investment in social areas have   11
successfully mobilized private investment in pharmaceuticals, surgical instruments, and 
other medical practices
9.  
•  Developing new services and market-based systems of rationing. The private sector has an 
essential role where demand is expanding or the patterns of demand are changing. When 
these changes happen, it is an increasingly important provider of higher education, for 
example. Skills development and professional development, for instance, can be funded 
privately, either directly at the level of the firm or through reimbursement mechanisms. It 
is inevitable that some costly procedures, perhaps of limited efficacy, cannot be funded 
universally. The government is able to set the context of what is considered an essential 
service available for all. The private sector can ration access to other services using the 
price mechanism. 
However, on efficiency grounds governmental agencies, as well as private companies, need to 
consider the costs and benefits of contracting out versus in-house provision. With regard to 
the benefits, it is usually argued that contracting-out allows savings on the long-term costs of 
hiring specialised experts, who may be required only in very specific periods of time being 
under-occupied for the rest of the time. On the other hand, public bodies often attempt to fill 
the “capability gap” by contracting out functions where “in-house” capacity is limited
10. This 
may be particularly required for capabilities that are highly specialised.  
Consequently, contracting out, if done in the right fashion, enables governmental agencies to 
benefit from the combined force of specialization and competition, and therefore to reduce 
their costs substantially. The savings provided by adopting outsourcing, seem in some cases 
significant. Overall, it has been estimated that the benefits of competitive contracting out may 
allow reductions in costs by as much as 10-20 percent, at the same time as constant quality is 
maintained
11. If the advantages are so important, public bodies need to assess their functions 
according to their relevance to their core values, and contract out all the others
12. 
Alongside these attributed benefits to contracting out, the cost side should not be overlooked. 
Contracting  out  will  increase  transaction  costs,  including both  contracting  and  monitoring 
                                                 
9  Nevertheless,  the  government  must  retain  an  important  role  in  financing basic  research that  can  produce 
important building blocks for subsequent applications that may improve well-being and for which short-run 
commercial gains are not apparent. 
10 In order to develop specific systems or carry out training on a short-term basis, it could be more effective to 
acquire capabilities externally. 
11 See Domberger (1998). 
12 See Prahalad et al (1990) for a managerial perspective on this subject. 
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costs
13. Moreover, the costs related to the loss of monopsony purchasing power and the social 
costs arising from equity problems (Robinson, 1990; von Otter and Saltman, 1992)
14 could be 
significant. But, these direct costs are not the only ones that we must control in public services 
provision.  In  this  specific  sector,  contracting-out  requires  maintaining  minimum  levels  of 
qualified staff in-house in order to specify employment terms clearly and in a way that fits the 
specific purposes of the activity, or to correct the service provided externally in the event of 
provider failure. Table 1 synthesises the pros and cons of contracting out.  
 
Table 1. Pros and cons of contracting out 
Pros  Cons 
Reducing costs, for the same 
level of quality 
 
Filling the “capabilities gap” 
 
The  replacement  of  direct, 
hierarchical  management 
structure  by  contractual 
relationships  between 
purchasers  and  providers 
will increase: 
•  transparency 
of prices 
•  competition 
 
Which will lead to a gain in 
efficiency 
•  Private  providers  respond  to  the  population’s 
willingness  to  pay  for  public  services.  As  a  result, 
they will serve those groups in the population who 
are  most  willing  to  pay,  such  as  affluent  urban 
residents.  The  result  will  be  increased  inequity  in 
access and use of public services. 
•  Because  of  lower  willingness  to  pay,  private 
providers  will  undersupply  socially  desirable 
services,  such  as  immunizations  and  personal 
preventive  care.  This  will  worsen  allocative 
efficiency in the corresponding sector. 
•  Driven  by  the  profit  motive,  and  because  they 
have  significant  control  over  demand,  private 
providers will take advantage of clients by supplying 
more than is required. This is particularly significant 
in  health  care  services.  This  is  inefficient  and  may 
result in health-weakening actions. 
•  Private  providers  can  also  take  advantage  of 
clients by providing low-quality services, which may 
result in welfare losses
15. 
The actual effect of these four major worries is as greater 
as there is lack of competition. 
 
                                                 
13 See Coase (1960) for the economic framework in the “make vs. buy” decisions, and Brueck (1997) and 
Donahue (1989) for its practical applications. 
14 In addition, some other impacts should be taken into account, too. As Mills (1995) argues, the introduction of 
contracts may both lead to a fragmentation or lack of co-ordination within the broader public service system, and 
could have an impact on staff resources with a drain of key personnel to the for-profit providers. 
15 See Berman (1997). 
   13
As is apparent from the analysis of table 1, several factors come into play in reaching efficient 
decisions. Factors like the need to fill a “capability gap” or to reduce costs would advise the 
contracting out of some functions. If this is the case, public bodies face the need of, at least, 
maintaining  quality  constant.  Such  decisions  should  be  based  on  the  identification  of  the 
agency’s core functions and consideration of the costs and benefits of contracting out versus 
in-house provision. In the last twenty-five years, more and more governments in developing 
countries are turning to private sector participation as an alternative answer to the traditional 
solutions based on conventional projects centred on public investments in new capacity and 
training. Let us see some of those solutions. 
 
5. Private sector involvement in public services 
As highlighted in previous sections, the provision of public services has undergone major 
changes in the last two decades with many developed and developing countries choosing to 
move away from the traditional public sector model of service provision and to introduce 
private sector participation. The involvement of private sector in public services has followed, 
in general, six basic forms: 
•  Short  term  service  contracts.  In  this  option,  specific  tasks,  usually  everyday 
maintenance jobs, are contracted to the private sector, but overall services management 
remains within the public sector. This type of contracts has been implemented in many 
countries with good records of success and is often seen as a first step towards PPP. In 
order to define the compensation to the private sector partner, two types of contract are 
frequent. In a quantity-based maintenance contract, the remuneration of the contractor is 
based on unit prices defined in the contract and the quantities are measured on site. The 
other type — performance-based maintenance contract — is derived from the previous 
one type of arrangement, by shifting the focus from administration (maintenance activities 
and resources) to certain performance conditions valued by the users. In this case, the 
payment is based on a fee directly stated in the agreement and linked to performance 
indicators. 
•  Management contract. A management contract is an arrangement by which a private 
company  is  entrusted  with  various  types  of  tasks,  relating  to  the  organization  and 
maintenance operations usually performed by the public authority. This type of contract 
involves the payment of a fee to the private company. Usually, the function of the private   14
firm  is  to  respond  to  day-to-day  routine  maintenance  needs  by  contracting  private 
companies, on behalf of the public entity.  
•  Lease. In this form, a private company leases the assets of a utility, and maintains and 
operates them, in return for the right to revenues.  
•  Greenfield Projects. These are new projects usually built and operated by the private 
sector that takes on the commercial risk. Political and exchange rate risk can sometimes be 
shared with the public sector. Such projects can take many forms, but the most common is 
Build-operate transfer (BOT). In this option, very usual in public works, the private 
sector develops, finances and operates bulk facilities. Under a BOT, the responsibility of 
the concessionaire is not limited to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure but 
it  also  includes  a  component  of  initial  construction,  upgrading  or  major  road 
rehabilitation. Massive investment and consequent mobilization of private funding sources 
are therefore required from this company, which is to be repaid from the revenue collected 
from service users (usually tolls). The BOT arrangement stresses the responsibility of the 
private entity during construction and operation of the infrastructure and the transfer of the 
assets to the public entity at the end of the operation period. The high initial investment 
required  from  the  private  sector  and  the  consequent  long  concession  period  turn  the 
distribution of risk between the parties into a key element of success in such schemes. 
Others  forms  of  Greenfield  projects  include  Build-Own-Operate-Transfer  (BOOT), 
Design-build-operate  (DBO),  Design-Build-Finance-Operate  (DBFO)  and  Build-Lease-
Transfer (BLT)
16. 
•  Concession. In a concession a public entity owns the assets, but it contracts with the 
private sector for operations, maintenance and investment. For instance, a road concession 
is  an  arrangement  under  which,  the  owner  of  the  road,  delegates  to  a  private  entity 
(concessionaire)  the  responsibility  for  providing  and  maintaining  a  specified  level  of 
service to road users in exchange for the right to collect revenue from those users. Besides 
the issues inherent in a concession agreement, an operation and maintenance concession is 
similar in scope and approach to what is required and negotiated in a typical operation and 
maintenance agreement between private parties under a BOT-type arrangement. 
•  Divestiture: the assets of a public utility are sold to the private sector. 
                                                 
16 Other variations on this type of contract have been implemented with a consequently growing number of 
acronyms used to label them (v. g., BOO, BTO). 
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From the above description, it is obvious that several aspects may distinguish the diverse 
forms of private involvement. If the principal reason of the participation of the private sector 
is the large potential for gains in efficiency in the public sector, it may be expected that 
projects  with  higher  level  of  private  sector  involvement  deliver  more  efficiency  gains. 
However,  the  consequent  risk  of  failure  grows  correspondingly.  The  following  table 
summarises advantages and drawbacks of the different options from a theoretical perspective.  
 
Table 2. Pros and cons of the different private involvement options 
Option  Pros  Cons  Typical 
duration 
Service contract  Can inject good 
technical expertise 
Unlikely to greatly improve 
performance where overall 
management is weak 
6 months to 2 
years 
Management contract  Gains in managerial 
efficiency 
Gains can be difficult to 
enforce; public entity 




Commercial risk borne 






public entity remains 
responsible for investments 
10 to 15 
years 
Greenfield projects 
Good way of getting 
efficient delivery of 
bulk services, with 
private investment 
Not a good solution if 
supporting distribution 
systems are in bad shape, or 
traffic levels are uncertain 
15 to 30 
years 
Concession 





commitment and regulatory 
capacity 
25 to 30 
years 





but may be 
limited by a 
license 
 
As it is apparent from table 2, options that yield higher social benefits also tend to demand a 
higher level of government commitment, and a better prepared institutional framework.  
According to the PPI database (World Bank, 2006), Between 1990 and 2003, there were over 
2750 projects with private participation in infrastructure in developing countries, with total 
public  and  private  investment  in  these  projects  amounting  to  785.758  billion  of  US  2002 
dollars (table 3).    16
The analysis of the importance of PPPs in developing countries shows a concentration around 
a scarce number of sectors and around a reduced number of countries. Table 3 illustrates the 
importance of PPPs in four sector and six large regions together with the prevalence of each 
type of PPP by sector and region. 
 
Table 3. Type of PPP by Sector of activity and Region  
  Total  Type of PPP: 
  (USD millions)  Management 







Sector:  785,758  0.1  14  45  41 
Energy  260,224   0.0  4  54  42 
Telecom  362,194   0.1  1  44  54 
Transport  123,553   0.3  57  37  6 
Water  39,787   0.3  67  18  15 
Region:           
E. Asia and 
Pacific  
186,729  0.0  16  63  21 
Europe and 
Central Asia  
118,580  0.1  5  46  49 
Latin America   373,592  0.1  17  29  53 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
30,958  0.1  25  47  28 
South Asia   45,026  0.0  2  90  8 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
30,879  1.4  12  53  34 
Source: World Bank (2006).  
 
It is apparent from the table that private participation in infrastructure in developing countries 
has been concentrated in the telecommunications sector, which accounted for 46.1% of the 
cumulative investment in 1990-2003. Energy, which includes electricity and the distribution 
of natural gas, attracted the second largest share of investment, accounting for 33.1% of the 
cumulative investment in private infrastructure projects. In contract, private participation in 
the water sector has been limited, accounting for 5.1% of cumulative investments over the 
same period. The limited amount of private involvement in water utilities is likely to reflect 
the inherent difficulties that face privatization in this sector, in terms of the technology of 
water provision and the nature of the product.  
The  transport  sector  represents  only  15.7  per  cent  of  total  investment.  One  half  of  this 
investment has gone into toll roads, with the rest in railways, seaports and airports. Unlike in   17
telecommunications and energy, concessions are by far the most important form of PPP in 
this sector, owing partly to the political sensitivity of transferring public assets to the private 
sector.  In  the  1990s,  three  quarters  of  toll  road  concessions  involved  expansion  or 
rehabilitation  of  existing  roads  rather  than  the  construction  of  new  infrastructures. 
Divestitures have been rare and have mostly occurred in China where minority stakes were 
sold in several state-owned toll road companies in order to finance future road construction 
(OECD, 2005). 
In regions, policy makers appear to have a preference for greenfield projects, which allow 
new  infrastructure  to  be  built  without  necessarily  having  to  embark  on  major  structural 
reforms.  Exceptions  are  found  only  in  Latin  America  and  transition  economies  where 
divestitures were more widespread, reflecting major privatization programs in many countries 
in these regions. 
The greater prevalence of greenfield projects in Asia and of divestitures in Latin America 
show  that  private  investment  has  tended  to  complement  public  expenditure  in  Asia  and 
replace it in Latin America. As a matter of fact, in Latin America private participation in 
infrastructure was often part of a broader reform program where divestitures and concessions 
of existing assets predominated in the cumulative investment in private infrastructure projects. 
In  contrast  to  Latin  America,  the  Asia  region  has  focused  on  the  creation  of  new  assets 
through greenfield projects. 
Table  4  shows  the  occurrence  of  each  type  of  PPP  across  sectors  and  regions.  Most 
concessions  contracts  are  seen  in  the  transport  sector  and  most  divestitures  in  telecoms. 
Greenfield projects were quite equally divided between energy and telecommunications, as 
are management and lease contracts between telecoms and transport. The largest share of both 
concessions and divestitures has arisen in Latin America, while greenfield investments are 
much more evenly distributed. Almost one half of the management and lease contracts have 
been implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Predictably, divestitures and greenfield projects, which involve actual investment, have taken 
the largest part of PPPs (85.6%). The latter tend to be most prevalent in the energy sector, 
divestitures in telecoms, and concessions in both transport and water sectors. 
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Table 4. Importance of PPPs by sector and Region 
  Type of PPP: 
 
Management 
and Lease  Concession  Greenfield  Divestiture 
Sector:  884  112,653  352,489  319,732 
Energy  2%  10%  40%  34% 
Telecom  44%  5%  45%  62% 
Transport  40%  62%  13%  2% 
Water  15%  24%  2%  2% 
Region:         
E. Asia and Pacific  0.2%  27%  33%  12% 
Europe and Central Asia  8%  5%  15%  18% 
Latin America  43%  57%  31%  62% 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
2%  7%  4%  3% 
South Ásia  0.0%  1%  11%  1% 
Sub-Saharan África  48%  3%  5%  3% 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
 
Although almost all developing countries have witnessed some form of private investment in 
infrastructure since 1990, private investors in infrastructure have tended to be directed to a 
small  group  of  developing  countries:  the  ones  with  relatively  large,  rich  or  fast-growing 
markets. Table 5 shows the top 25 destinations for investment in PPPs in infrastructure in 
developing and transition economies in the 1990-2003 period.  
The 25 countries presented in table 5 account for almost 90 per cent of total. Among the 
developing regions, Latin America accounted for the great bulk of the cumulative investment 
in  infrastructure.  Together  3  Latin  American  countries  (Brazil,  Argentina  and  Mexico) 
account for more than a third of total PPP investment in the developing world. 
The extreme concentration of the investment in Latin America countries, where corruption 
has high indexes by international standards or in Transition Economies acknowledged by poor   19
market regulation, can explain almost partly some recent disappoint about PPPs that contrast 
with the higher expectations prevalent in the middle of 1990s
17. 
 
Table 5. Investment in PPPs by country, 1990-2003 
Country  USD millions  per cent  Country  USD millions  per cent 
Brazil  157,098  19.7%  Czech Repub.  16,388  2.1% 
Argentina  72,858  9.1%  South Africa  15,959  2.0% 
China  61,170  7.7%  Russia  14,784  1.9% 
México  59,753  7.5%  Colombia  13,779  1.7% 
Malaysia  36,695  4.6%  Peru  13,762  1.7% 
India  33,108  4.2%  Morocco  12,812  1.6% 
Philippines  31,017  3.9%  Venezuela  11,858  1.5% 
Indonesia  29,210  3.7%  Pakistan  7,487  0.9% 
Thailand  23,662  3.0%  Slovak Repub.  5,837  0.7% 
Chile  22,003  2.8%  Egypt  5,689  0.7% 
Poland  18,025  2.3%  Romania  5,321  0.7% 
Turkey  17,719  2.2%  Bolivia  4,848  0.6% 
Hungary  17,415  2.2%  Top 25  708,257  88.9% 
Source: World Bank (2006). 
 
PPPs have been an important vehicle for the investment of OECD multinational companies 
(MNCs)  in  developing  countries’  utilities  and  infrastructure  sectors.  According  to  OECD 
(2005) there is a propensity for larger investment size to involve a greater domination by 
multinational players. For instance, in telecommunications, the top 20 investors account for 
over 60 per cent of total investment (see OECD, 2005, table 5). MNCs domiciled in OECD 
countries represent only 1 per cent of private investors, but 30 per cent of total investment in 
telecommunications and energy. Consequently, infrastructure projects are under control of a 
small group of large firms. 
                                                 
17 See OECD (2005). This report explains the decrease in actual investment in infrastructure projects involving 
PPPs  by  the  fact  that  either  developing  country  authorities,  or  investors  (or  both)  may  have  had  too  high 
expectations to what could be reached.  
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This implies that, for example, a government negotiating the terms of private participation is 
not necessarily faced with an “atomistic” group of suppliers, and may in practice be dealing 
with one corporate entity with a market power comparable, or even superior, to its own. This 
fact needs to be kept in mind when we emphasize the need of strong regulatory bodies in 
developing countries.  
 
6. Conditions for building PPPs and the need of regulation 
Both macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions affect the building of a PPP in a specific 
country: in a macro level we find all the incentives for putting up a PPP; in a micro level we 
find all those circumstances related to the capacities of the different actors in acting as a 
competent partner. Concerning the macro level, political factors are important: without an 
overall political environment favouring both private for-profit and not-for-profit activities no 
real partnership can be established. In countries where civil society and/or the private sector 
are discriminated, the government will remain the dominant supplier of social services.  
Apart from the political factor, the economic situation in a country is important. A financial 
and economic crisis is often the starting point for the rethinking of government activities. As a 
matter  of  fact,  we  can  mostly  find  two  actual  factors  in  the  origin  of  the  increasing 
attentiveness to PPPs. First, there are fiscal pressures that have led governments to look for 
innovative solutions and for maximum effectiveness in reallocating resources. In this strand, 
various studies have shown that there is a large potential for gains in efficiency in the public 
service sector. Second, some other studies demonstrate that private providers either non-profit 
or for-profit oriented can play an important role in social service provision, a role which has 
been, in the past, largely neglected by governments. 
However, in spite of the role that the private sector can play in social service provision, the 
financial engagement of the government in the public services sector is crucial in the mid to 
long-term  for  the  sustainability  of  a  PPP,  as  the  poorer  part  of  the  population  will 
continuously depend on public support. Finally, on the macro level, the legal framework is 
important. The credibility and transparency of the cooperation between the different players 
are critical determinants for a long-term success of a PPP.  
Concerning the micro-level, several conditions are important for establishing a PPP. First of 
all, there must be an interest and a commitment of some individuals to make a PPP happen. 
As in the Venezuelan case (Jütting, 1999), the personal involvement of the users of services   21
helped to provide an efficient and equitable service provision. If there is an interest in a PPP 
and  an  acceptance  of  the  different  partners  to  be  involved,  then  one  has  to  look  at  the 
capacities of the different actors. In this respect, we have to consider not all the skills of the 
staff  to  provide  specific  services,  but  also  the  financial  availability  for  an  engagement  in 
service provision and the overall organisational and management structure. 
The need of efficiency calls for the existence of independent regulatory bodies
18. Ultimately, 
the  sustainability  of  the  reforms  and  the  ability  of  the  public  sector  to  use  money  more 
effectively in leveraging private money will depend significantly on the political commitment 
to design and carry out effective regulatory policies. 
The main changes in the last two decades in provision of public services, both in developed 
and  developing  countries,  calls  for  strong  and  competent  economic  regulation  of 
infrastructure and social sector services, in order to ensure that the interests of all parties are 
protected. Such protection is necessary first and foremost, to defend the customers’ interests 
but also those of the public and private parties to a contract
19. Those institutions in charge of 
regulating public services, which we refer to as “regulators” in this paper, can either take the 
form  of  an  independent  regulatory  agency,  or  be  set  up  as  a  specialised  cell  under  line 
Ministries, or even be a department within line Ministries. 
The role of institutions in charge of carrying out regulatory functions is even more important 
in developing countries than in developed ones. In the former, owing to several reasons that 
affect differently the two groups of countries, a much more intrusive and demanding form of 
regulation is required. Besides the reduced educational level of the population and the scarcity 
of infrastructures, which may restrict the availability and circulation of information, many 
other reasons affect the effectiveness of the regulation in developing countries. However, in 
developing countries  the  need for regulation is  even more  vital, because they are usually 
characterized by non-competitive industry structures and/or lack of capital market discipline. 
In such environments, too little market information is revealed and information asymmetries 
are overwhelming.  
                                                 
18 For details on how specific features of regulatory contracts have been implemented in various developing 
countries and the lessons that can be drawn from that knowledge, see Bakovic et al. (2003). 
19 Since the beginning of utility reforms in the late 1980s – early 1990s, it is estimated that about 200 regulators 
in some 130 countries have been granted the functions of regulating public services such as telecommunications, 
water, and electricity (World Bank, 2004). 
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In  addition,  regulators  in  developing  countries  face  other  specific  challenges,  when  large 
portions of the customer base for infrastructure services are poor and unconnected, tariffs are 
being kept artificially low, baseline information for decisions tends to be limited or unreliable 
and the regulators have difficulties in establishing their credibility and in implementing sound 
governance arrangements. 
As a matter of fact, to be effective, regulators are required to fill three qualities: competence, 
this  quality  being  measured  by  access  to  technical  expertise  in  a  wide  variety  of  areas; 
independence, both from government interference and from capture by service providers and 
interest  groups;  and  legitimacy,  i.e.,  both  long-lasting  by  existing  legal  principles  and 
practices and being transparent and accountable.  
Many, if not all, regulators in developing countries lack one or all of the qualities required for 
effective  regulation.  These  deficiencies  can  be  due  to  different  reasons,  including  limited 
resources, repeated political interference in regulatory decisions, difficulty in attracting and 
retaining  competent  staff, and  short  or  no  history of performing regulatory functions. All 
these  deficiencies  are  particularly  apparent  in  the  case  of  countries  emerging  from  social 
conflict or where the political environment makes it difficult to set up any kind of independent 
institution. 
Where there is lack of independence we can’t prospect either great legitimacy or competence. 
This  lack  in  turn  limits  capacity  of  agencies  in  charge  of  regulation  to  act  as  effective 
regulators, i.e. to promote adequate levels of investment in the regulated sector through the 
setting  of  tariffs  that  recover  costs  without  depriving  part  of  the  society  from  using  the 
services,  to  attract  private  investment  and/or  to  monitor  the  public  sector  for  superior 
performance.  
Of course,  developing countries can contract out regulatory functions taking profit of the 
developing assistance
20. Though this can be a temporary solution it is in many cases seen as a 
foreign intromission in internal affairs and it is consequently felt as a lack of independence of 
the regulators. Furthermore, as has been acknowledge “paradoxically, those regulators who 
would most benefit from contracting out are the ones that have most difficulties in entering 
into  such  agreements  to  bring  about  a  satisfactory  outcome,  either  for  lack  of  financial 
capacity or capacity to monitor performance…” (World Bank, 2004).  
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the theoretical rationale for contracting out by public or private agencies and how this 
rationale may be applied to utility regulation in order to improve regulatory effectiveness, see World Bank 
(2004). 
   23
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Owing to the worldwide welfare systems reform, public bodies are permanently confronted 
with the decision of whether they should produce a service internally or contract it out. In 
many  cases,  developing  countries  experiment  forms  of  private  sector  involvement  in 
provision  of  impure  public  goods  both  of  type  B  (education,  health  care)  and  of  type  C 
(infrastructures, utilities), searching efficiency gains and relying in PPPs for attaining this 
endeavour. However, the results are very different from one to another type of goods. While 
telecommunications  and  other  infrastructures  have  had  a  great  receptivity  by  Foreign 
Investment, education and health care are generally overlooked. 
In numerous developing countries the role of the private sector in providing public goods of 
type B is still neglected or limited to a typical contract in an outsourcing way, overlooking the 
potential benefits of genuine PPPs, namely the ones involving not-for-profit private sector 
organizations.  The  theory  shows  that  PPPs,  namely  through  the  capacity  of  not-for-profit 
private actors to participate in the provision and determining/management of social services 
have a positive effect on efficiency, equity and quality of service provision. In some countries, 
Venezuela  for  example  (Jütting,  1999),  a  substantial  part  of  the  population  was  formerly 
excluded from both public as well as for-profit provided health care. Only after the explicit 
recognition and building of linkages between the not-for-profit sector and the government, did 
poor people have the chance to set up their own systems.  
In developing countries, the poor population especially depends on the support of the public 
sector. But, beside the role of the government concerning social protection, another important 
role is the setting of rules and standards of conduct. The design of rules and regulation and its 
enforcement  are  crucial  in  efficiency  and  equity  grounds,  where  government  decides 
contracting out public services or involve itself in a partnership. 
The involvement and the delegation of power to the local level are important. Without the 
active participation of the communities and the municipalities, which can better deal with 
information  asymmetries,  it  is  difficult  to  implement  innovative  solutions  in  social  sector 
services.  Such  solutions  should  integrate  the  local  people  in  designing,  providing  and 
monitoring services. Moreover, if they use voluntary work they can provide services at lower 
costs. Finally, through such self-help activities mid-term to long-term benefits in form of a 
strengthening of social capital among community members might mature.   24
On the other hand, the use of PPPs for the provision of type C goods, where the majors PPPs 
are built, is subject of some drawbacks too. First, developing countries are to a great extent 
dependent  to  the  foreign  investment  of  a  restrict  number  of  large  companies,  with  the 
consequent effects on the negotiation of the contracts. Second, the capacity of these countries 
to design a regulatory framework (either in legislation or through a contract) is very limited. 
Third, the non-competitive industry structures and/or lack of capital market discipline makes 
mandatory the quality and credibility of regulation.  
The  development  of  an  outline  on  how  to  build  a  PPP  in  the  public  services  sector  of 
developing countries is both undesirable and unattainable. It depends on a variety of country 
specific  conditions  that  set  the  framework  for  cooperation  between  the  different  actors. 
Moreover,  PPPs  vary  across-countries  in  targets,  forms,  processes  and  parties.  The  most 
successful co-operative arrangements, stem from a flexible approach drawing and adapting 
experience of other cases, but are not simple copies (Gentry and Fernandez, 1998).  
History  suggests  that  fine-tunings  are  often  more  difficult  to  put  into  practice  than  large 
reforms. If governments and international development aid will support this emerging policy 
agenda, a new hybrid model of PPP will emerge with a significantly larger positive impact for 
users, operators and current, as well as future, taxpayers. However, the corrections needed to 
the reform path require a strong political commitment at the national as well as at the local 
level.  This  commitment  is  also  needed  because  addressing  these  issues  implies  strong 
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